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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in Brown v. Woods, 39
Pac. Rep. 473, has lately held, that an attorney-at-law, who
has been suspended from the practice of law in
Attorney,
Suspension,
the district court of a county in which he has
Effect
been elected county attorney, is not eligible to
enter upon the performance of the duties of that office, so
long as the order of suspension remains in full force, and not
reversed.
A passenger who leaves a street car in obedience to an order
of a policeman called by the conductor to remove him, is not
restricted to damages for the trouble in being put
Carriers,
off the car, and the additional expense necessary
Election
of Passenger,
to complete his journey: Laird v. Pittsburgh
Exemplary
Damages
Traction Co., (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,)
31 At. Rep. 51.
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A certiorari will not lie to review the action of a magistrate
Certiorari, in issuing what is commonly known as a "search
Search
warrant:" State v. Springer, (Supreme Court of
Warrant

Nev Jersey,) 31 Atl. Rep.

215.

The Supreme Court of California has recently decided, that,
since the jurisdiction of a state over crimes committed within
its territory is general, and that of the United
Conflict
of Laws,
States is exceptional, depending upon the fact
State
and
Federal
that it has purchased land, with the consent of
Jurisdiction

the state legislature, for forts, arsenals, and other

buildings, it is not necessary, in an indictment in the state
courts, to negative the jurisdiction of the federal courts: Pco.
v. Coins, 39 Pac. Rep. 16.
In view of the free and easy way in which some courts are
in the habit of playing with the constitutionality of statutes, it
constitutional may be well to quote and commend the language
Law,
of the Supreme Court of Michigan, apropos of
TestPrinciples this subject, in a recent case: "The
power
of declaring laws unconstitutional should be exercised with
extreme caution, and never where serious doubt exists as to
the conflict. In case of doubt, every possible presumption,
not clearly inconsistent with the language and the subjectmatter, is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of the
act:" Rouse v. Donovan, 62 N. W. Rep. 359.
A constitutional amendment does not take effect before the
Amendment to Constitution, canvass of the vote by which it is
Time of Taking Effect

adopted: City of Duluth v. Duhlth St.

Ry. Co., (Supreme Court of Minnesota,) 62 N. W. Rep. 267.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has held, in Fordv. Chicago
Milk Shippers' Assn., 39 N. E. Rep. 651, that when an act
Obligation of declares certain combinations to control prices
Contracts

illegal, and provides that a purchaser

of any

articles from any individual or corporation doing business in
violation of the act, shall not be liable for the price of that
article, and may plead the act as a defense to a suit for the
price, the latter provision is not unconstitutional, as impairing
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the obligation of contracts, even when the contracts in question
were made before the passage of the act, if the articles
were supplied to the purchaser after its passage.
The Court of Appeals of New York has recently decided,
in spite of the dissent of Judges PECKHAM1, O'BRIEN and BART-

that, though the legislature cannot, under the
guise of the police power, enact measures which
restrain the citizen in the free pursuit of a lawful. occupation,
yet an act, which forbids any person to exercise the calling of
a master plumber without passing an examination before a
board thereby created, is a valid exercise of the police power,
since the work of plumbing is essential to the comfort and
health of the inhabitants of cities; and that the act is not
void (i) as restraining individuals from working as plumbers,
since it applies only to master or employing plumbers; (2)
Nor as creating a monopoly, though the act applies only to
master or employing plumbers, and requires two of the five
members of the board to be employing plumbers; (3) Nor
because the board acts unfairly or oppressively in the examination of applicants, since it provides for the appointment of
an impartial board: Peo. ex re. N-echamicus v. Warden of Cio ,
Prison, 3§ N. E. Rep. 686; affirming 30 N. Y. Suppl. io95.
Judge PECKHAM, in his dissenting opinion, very clearly
proves the utter absurdity of the attempt of the majority to
rest the validity of this law upon the fancied security that it
affords the public against unsanitary plumbing, by pointing out
the simple fact that it neither provides for an examination of
the journeymen plumbers, who do the real work, nor requires
any careful supervision of that work by the master plumber
who employs them; and also indicates this very serious
defect, that the act leaves the requirements of the examination
wholly to the discretion of the examining board, who may
make that examination either so easy as to defeat any possible
benefit that may result, or so difficult as to shut out all applicants, and so secure to the master plumbers already licensed
a practical. monopoly of the business. This decision is a
flagrant example of the abuse of the police power; and one
that should have called forth a reproof rather than a comPolice Power

LETT,
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mencation from the court. If the present drift of judicial
opinion on the extent of the police power continues, we may
expect to have, in a few years, examinations for garbage collectcrs and for street cleaners, in order to provide for the
proper protection of the public health ; it being well known
that negligence in these matters is the cause of a great deal
of disease.
The Supreme Court of the same state has recently held,
that an act providing that no person not vaccinated shall be
Compulsory admitted to any of the public schools of the
Vaccination
state is constitutional: In re Walters, 32 N. Y.
Suppl. 322.
In Pennsylvania, it has been held that the school board of a
city has the right, by virtue of its discretionary powers, to
exclude a pupil who will not submit to be vaccinated during
a small-pox scare" Dufeld v. School District of Williamsport,
29 At. Rep. 742.
An agreement by property owners and persons engaged in
business in the immediate neighborhood of a post office, to
pay the owners of the building in which it is
Contract,
Public Policy located a specified sum monthly for a certain
time, in case the building is rented to the government for a
nominal sum, in order to retain the post office in that locality,
is founded on sufficient consideration, and is not void, as
against public policy: Fearnley v. De Mainville, (Court of
Appeals of Colorado,) 39 Pac. Rep. 73.
The Supreme Court of the United States has just decided
one of the most vexed questions of criminal law,-that of
Criminal Law, the power of the jury to judge of the law of the
Functions of case, as well as the facts.
It held, in accord with
CourtandJury the better reasoning, that the court, in criminal as
well as in civil cases, is alone empowered to determine the law;
and that therefore it may refuse to charge on degrees of homicide of which there is no evidence, and may state that, under
the evidence, there must either be an acquittal, or a conviction
-of murder: Sparf v. United States, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2'3.
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But while the general proposition is unquestionably sound,
.pace the palliator of crime, the application of it to this particular case may well be questioned. The ruling of the lower
court comes perilously near to a ruling on the effect of the
evidence; and there would therefore seem to be much reason
for the dissent of Justices GRAY and SaRans. The dissenting
opinion of the former is a very full and profound exposition
of the history of the controversy on this point, and the reasons
for the opinion contrary to that of the majority of the court;
and is well worth careful study, even if it fails to convince.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, a
prosecuting officer may, on his own motion, present a bill to
Information the grand jury, without presenting an affidavit
without
charging the offence, if he deems it necessary for
Affidavit
the public good; and his action in doing so will be
disturbed only in case of abuse of discretion: State v. Bowmah,
20 S. E. Rep. ioIo.
When a prisoner, after pleading guilty, is allowed to go out
of custody without bail, the court has no further jurisdiction
over him, and cannot, at a subsequent term, order
Discharge,
Rearrest
his rearrest, and pronounce sentence upon him:
Peo. v. Allen, (Supreme Court of Illinois,) 39 N. E. Rep. 568.
In an action for the death of the plaintiff's son, on the
ground that the plaintiff has been deprived of his son's support,
Damages,
the "Insurance Experience Life Tables" are admisBvidence,
sible to show the probable duration of the plainMortality
Tables

tiff's life, though he is in poor health; the latter
circumstance only affects the weight to be given them:
Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Leonard, 29 S. W. Rep. 955.
There is an article on the admissibility of life and mortality
tables in evidence, in 36 Cent. L. J. 75, which contains most of
the important cases decided up to that time; but it may not
be amiss to cite the more recent decisions on this point.
Any standard life tables, properly identified, are admissible,
in case of death or permanent injury, to show the probable
duration of life of the deceased or injured person: Richmond
& Danville R. R. v: Garner,91 Ga. 27; S. C., I6 S. E. Rep.
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i i o ; e. g., the Carlisle tables; Louisville, N. 0. & C. Ry. Co. v.
h iller, (Ind.) 37 N. E. Rep. 343; the American Mortality
tables; Richmond & Danville R. R. v. Hissong, 97 Ala. 187;
S. C., 13 So. Rep. 209; Lonisville & A-- R. Co. v. Hurt,
(Ala.) 13 So. Rep. 130; Greer v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
(Ky.) 21 S. W. Rep. 649; or any life tables shown to be used
by all life insurance companies as a basis for life insurance;
Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith, (Tex.) 26 S. W. Rep. 644.
They are admissible, even though the plaintiff is engaged in a
more hazardous occupation than that with reference to which
they were made up: Birmingham 3fineral R. R. Co. v. Wilmer,
97 Ala. 165 ; S. C., i i So. Rep. 886.
They are not conclusive in any case, but are merely evidence
to go to the jury, and to be weighed as any other matter of
evidence: Mai , Lee Coal & Ry. Co. v. Clambliss, 97 Ala. 171;
S. C., i I So. Rep. 897 ; City of Friend v. Ingersoll, (Neb.,)
58 N. W. Rep. 281; and therefore cannot alone form a rule as
to the probable duration of life; iorrison v. 1l cAtee, 23 Oreg.
530; S. C., 32 Pac. Rep. 400.

Before they can be admitted,

a foundation must be laid by proving the age of the person
concerned, or by introducing evidence from which his age can
be inferred or approximately arrived at by the jury: Atlantic
Consolidated St. Ry. Co. v. Beauchamp, (Ga.,) 19 S. E. Rep. 24.
It has been held that the courts will take judicial notice of
standard tables, such as the American Mortality tables: Louisvdlle & Nashville R. R. v. Hothershed, 97 Ala. 261 ; S. C., 12
So. Rep. 714; which would of course dispense with the
necessity of authenticating them.
Vice-Chancellor Pitney, of the Court of Chancery of New
Jersey, has recently decided a novel and interesting case on
the subject of easements. The owner of a house,
Basement
with a yard attached, had placed a water pipe,
leading from a driven well in the yard to a sink in the kitchen
of the house, there ending in a pump, by which water could
be and was habitually drawn from the well to the kitchen for
domestic purposes. Both the well and the pipe were cormpletely hidden from view. The vice-chancellor held, under
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these circumstances, that the pipe formed an apparent and continuous easement, which would pass as appurtenant to the
dwelling by a conveyance of the latter alone; the former owner
of both still retaining the yard; and that the same result
would follow a simultaneous conveyance of the house and
yard by the owner to different persons, provided that the
grantee of the house and well had notice of the existence of
the connection between the well and the pump, and of the
other conveyance, and that that conveyance was made with his
consent: Larsen v. Peterson, 30 Atl. Rep. 1094.
In State v. Allen, 62 N. W. Rep. 35, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska has decided, that under the Ballot Law of that State,
(which is in this respect but little different from
Elections,
those of other states which have adopted the
Rival
Conventions Australian Ballot System, or one of its modificacations,) it is not the province of the secretary of state to
determine which of two rival state conventions of the same
party is entitled to recognition as the regular convention; and
that therefore, when two factions of a political party nominate
candidates, and certify such nominations to the secretary of
state in due form, the latter will not inquire into the regularity
of the convention held by either faction, but will certify to the
several county clerks the names of the candidates nominated
by each. The Supreme Court of Colorado has gone a step
farther, and holds that neither the secretary of state, nor the
courts, have power to decide which of two rival conventions
of a political party has the right to act for the party: Peo. v.
Dist. Ct. of Arapahoe County, 31 Pac. Rep. 339.
The New York decisions (in the Supreme Court) are not
quite uniform. It has been held, on the one hand, that when
a minority faction of a party secedes, and organizes separately,
the decision of the majority faction that certain persons were
duly elected members at a caucus of the party is not conclusive, but reviewable by the court: In re Broat, 27 N. Y.
Suppl. 176; S. C., 6 Misc. Rep. 445 ; but on the otlier, that
a determination by the state convention of a party on a contest
between two delegations, as to the regularity of the conven-
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tions by which they were nominated, will be treated by the
courts as conclusive: In re Redmond, 25 N. Y. Suppl. 381 :
S. C., 5 Misc. Rep. 369; even though contrary to a previous
judicial determination of the same question: In re Pollard, 25
N. Y. Suppl. 385. The latter seems to be the true doctrine, as
the decisions of a political convention, like those of any other
tribunal of limited jurisdiction, ought to be conclusive on
matters within its jurisdiction, unless there exist grounds for
equitable relief, or express authority to interfere has been given
to the courts of law by statute.
An inmate of a veterans' home, who intends to stay there
as long as he lives, is a resident of the precinct in which the
Voters,

Inmates of
Home

home is located, and qualified to vote as such,
though he became an inmate of the home solely

because of his indigent circumstances: Stewart v.

Kyser, (Supreme Court of California,) 39 Pac. Rep. i9.
But under the Constitution of Michigan, Art. 7, § 5, providing that no elector shall be deemed to have gained or lost
a residence, "while kept at any almshouse or other asylum at
public expense," a person who becomes an inmate of a
soldiers' home gains no residence in the municipality where
the home is located, whatever may be his intention in entering it: Wolcott v. Holcomb, 97 Mich. 361; S. C., 56 N. W.
Rep. 837; Peo. v. Hanna, 98 Mich. 515; S. C., 57 N. W.
Rep. 738.
The question as to the right of a student at an educational
institution to vote, there or elsewhere, has received a full
Voters,

exposition in, and may now, perhaps, be considered

as finally settled, by the decision of the Supreme
Court of Nebraska, in Berry v. Wilcox, 62 N. W. Rep. 249.
In that case, the rulings were as follows: (i) The fact
that one is a student at an educational institution of itself
has no bearing upon his right to vote at that place;
if his residence is there, he may vote there, if otherwise
qualified: (2) A person's residence is where he has his
established home, where he is habitually present, and to
which he intends to return, whenever he departs therefrom;
the fact that he may intend to definitely remove therefrom
Students
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at some future time does not defeat his residence there,
until he actually does remove.; and it is not necessary that
he should have the intention of always remaining, but he
must not have an intention of. presently removing: (3) Persons, otherwise qualified to vote, who *come to an educational institution mainly for the sake of obtaining an education; who do not depend on their parents for support, do not
intend to return to their parental home when their studies are
conipleted, and are accustomed to leave the institution during
vacation, going wherever they can find employment, and returning to the institution when the term opens; who regard
the seat of the institution as their home, and have no fixed
purpose as to their movements after completing their studies,
are entitled to vote at the place where the institution is located.
As a rule, the residence of a student at an institution
of learning remains, for purposes of voting, with his parents :
Fry's Appeal, 71 Pa. 302; In re Lower Merion E-lection, i
Chest. Co. Rep. (Pa.) 257. But, in the absence of statutory
regulations, a student who leaves his home to go to college,
and definitely abandons his home, may gain a residence at the
college: In re Ward, 20 N. Y. Suppl. 606; S. C., 29 Abb.
N. C. 187 ; In re Lower Oxford Contested E-lection, i i Phila.
64; S. C., I Chest. Co. Rep. (Pa.) 253. So, a student who
went to college, and stayed there for seven years, acting
during vacations as waiter at different summer resorts, supporting himself by his own efforts, and only making brief
visits to his former home, will be held to have acquired
a residence at the college: Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Md. 66;
S. C., 20 Atl. Rep. 434. The burden of proof, however, to
establish change of residence, rests in any case upon the
student claiming to vote by reason thereof: In re Lower
Oxford Contested E-lection, i I Phila. 64; S. C., i Chest. Co.
Rep. (Pa.) 253.
But under the present Constitution of New York, Art. 2,
§ 3, providing that no person shall be deemed to have gained
a residence, for purposes of voting, while a student in any
seminary of learning, it is immaterial that a student has no
other domicile than the seminary: Goodman v. Bainton,
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(Supreme Court of New York-,) 31 N. Y. Suppl. 1043. This,
however, is an extreme case, and would hardly seem to be
within the reasonable intendment of the constitution.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has proved its ability, by
being almost the only cotrt to give a liberal interpretation to
the provisions of the Australian Ballot Laws for
Ballots,
Marking
marking ballots. That court has held, in Pennington v. Hare, 62 N. W. Rep. i 16, that though those provisions are mandatory, yet any mark, however crude and
imperfect in form, if it is apparent that it was honestly
intended as a cross-mark, and for nothing else, must be given
effect as such ; othervise electors unaccustomedto the use of pen
or pencil might be disfranchised. It also ruled, that a ballot
marked with the name of the voter could not be counted, as
it came within the prohibition of the use of a distinguishing
mark; but Collins, J., in a very able dissenting opinion, urges
the validity of such ballots with almost convincing force.
A witness may testify to a confession which he swears was
made by the accused to a third person in the dark, although
the witness states that he did not see the accused,
but only knew him by his voice; the testimony is
admissible, its value being a question for the jury: Fussell v.
State, (Supreme Court of Georgia,) 21 S. E. Rep. 97.
A person who overhears a conversation between an
Confidential attorney and his client, and who stands in no
Conmunica- confidential relation to either, may testify to the
lions.
conversation: People v. Buchanan, (Court of
Appeals of New York,) 39 N. E. Rep. 846.
According to the Supreme Court of the United States, the
reading in evidence on the second trial of a cause of a transcribed copy of the reporter's stenographic notes
Evidence of
Deceased
of the testimony of a witness for the prosecution
Witness
who has died since the first trial, is not an infringeEvidence,

Confessions

ment of the constitutional provision that the accused shall be
confronted with the witnesses against him: Mattox v. United
States, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337.
The Court of Appeals of New York has administered a
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rebuke to the absurd lengths to which expert
evidence is now carried, though in terms much
Evidence of
milder than the case warranted. On the trial of
Expert
the notorious Dr. Buchanan, for the murder of his wife, one
of the jurors, while at dinner at a lotel, after the case had been
submitted to the jury, was suddenly taken ill, and fainted.
Physicians, expert in mental diseases, examined the juror, and
gave it as their opinion that he was not affected with epilepsy
or paresis; and that his symptoms resembled those of nervous
exhaustion, due to his c!ose confinement as a juror. The
juror himself denied ever having suffered from epileptic attacks;
and physicians who had known and attended him testified that
he had never manifested any symptoms of nervous disease.
And yet other physicians were found, total strangers, who had
no knowledge of the facts other than that gained from the
statements of others, who dared to testify that, in their opinion,
the attack was of an epileptic character, and indicated a mental
disturbance that must have existed for several hours, and have
rendered his mental action unreliable and useless. This testimony was very properly held not to show that the juror was
mentally incapable of concurring in the verdict, and therefore
not good ground for setting it aside: Peo. v. Buchanan, 39
N. E. Rep. 846. This case, in common with many other
recent ones, goes to show how utterly unreliable the testimony
of the average expert is, especially when he has a pecuniary
stake in the question at issue,
deserved

The incumbent of an office, which it was attempted to
create by an unconstitutional statute, cannot be guilty of
extortion, as he is neither a dejure nor a defacto
Extortion
officer: Kiby v. State, (Supreme Court of New
Jersey,) 31 Atl. Rep. 213.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has lately held, that the
rule of the road, which requires travelers with vehicles, when
meeting, to each turn to the right, exists for the
Highways,
Rule of the benefit of travelers only, and not for the behoof
Road
of one who has wrongfully caused a bad condi.tion of the road or street.

One may, from motives of
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courtesy, or for other reasons, waive his right to have another
observe this rule, but is not bound to do so; and the fact that
he does waive it, and in so doing drives into a dangerous place
in the highway, and is thereby injured, affords no excuse to a
wrongdoer who caused the dangerous place to exist, and will
not prevent a recovery against such wrongdoer by the person
so injured, if the latter is free from negligence, and otherwise
entitled to recover: Atlanta St. .Ry. Co. v. Walker, 21 S. E.
Rep. 48.
The rule of the road has been adopted by statute in
most, if not all, of the states of the Union; but, it is not an
absolute requirement, which must be obeyed at all hazards. It
only applies to vehicles meeting and passing each other, and
others are not required to observe it: Johnson v. Small, 5 B.
Mon. (Ky.) 25; Brooks v. Hart, i4 N. H. 307; Parker v.
Adams, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 418. There are even exceptions to
its observance in the case of vehicles meeting and passing
each other; e. g., it is the duty of a light vehicle to give place
to a much heavier and more unwieldy one: Grier v. Sampson,
27 Pa. 183. Accordingly, the mere fact that a driver meeting
another vehicle turns to the left instead of to the right, is no
bar to a recovery for damages occassioned by a defect in the
highway: Grier v. Sampson, supra; O'Neil v. Town of East
Windsor, 63 Conn. I 5o; S. C., 27 Atl. Rep. 237; nor even

to a recovery for damages caused by a collision with the other
vehicle: Riepe v. Elting, (Iowa,) 56 N. V. Rep. 285. It is not
contributory negligence to turn to the left, in the hope of
allowing another, driving on the same side of the road, to
pass: Schinf v. Sliter, 64 Hun, (N. Y.) 463. It is a sufficient excuse for leading a horse on the left side of the street,
that the right side was crowded with cars, trucks, and other
vehicles: Mooner v. Tro-w Directory, Printing & Bookbinding Co., 21 N. Y. Suppl. 957; S. C., 2 Misc. Rep. 238; and
the fact that one is found on the wrong side of the road is not
conclusive evidence of fault: Randolph v. O'Riordan, 155
Mass. 331.

The rule of the road was never meant to apply to a highway formed by the junction of two streets crossing each other
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diagonally: Norris v. Saxton, 158 Mass. 46; S. C., 32 N. E.
Rep. 954. Where it does apply, however, it requires a driver
meeting another to keep to the right of the centre of the worked
part of the road, not to the right of the centre of the smooth or
traveled part.: Earingv. Lansingh, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 185.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in Conimonwealth v.
Delaney, 29 S. W. Rep. 616, has ruled, that when a person is
Hbmicide,
Rescue of Person Kidnapped

kidnapped, his friends may undertake his rescue,
and in case of resistance, may use such force as
will be necessary to accomplish the rescue; and

if the kidnappers attack them, and one of their number, in
defending himself,-shoots and kills any one, without intending
to do so, thd homicide is excusable. This is a reassertion of
the rule laid down on the first hearing of this case in error:
25 S. W. Rep. 830.
The Supreme Court of Indiana has lately held, in Stroup v.
Stroup, 39 N. E. Rep. 864, that when a husband, intending to
Husband and defeat his wife's dower, has land purchased by him
conveyed to another, but secures the full use and
Wife,
Fraud on
Maratii
Rights

disposition thereof to himself, the wife, as the conveyance is in fraud of her, may, either before or

after the husband's death, recover that part of the land which
would have fallen to her as dower, had her husband been
actually seised; and further, that when a husband purchases
land, and causes it to be conveyed to another in trust for
himself, reserving a life estate in it, and retaining a power of
disposition over it to his own use, he has an equitable interest
therein, to which dower may attach.
Riparian owners on navigable streams have no title to the
ice which forms on such streams, as an incident to their
ownership of the bank; and if a statute gives them
Ice,
Remedy
title to the ice opposite their property, and prefor Injury
scribes a remedy for invasion of their rights therein,
that remedy is exclusive: Briggs v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,
(Supreme Court of New York,) 32 N. Y. Suppl. 95. There
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is an annotation on the subject of property in ice, in 32 Ar.
L. REG. & REv. 166.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Emert v. State
of Missouri, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367, has recently decided, that a
Interstate
state law prohibiting peddlers, who deal in selling
Commerce,
Peddlers,
License Tax

goods by going from place to place to sell the
same, from peddling without a license, which

must state how the dealing is to be carried on, and must also
be exhibited on demand to any sheriff, collector, constable, or
citizen householder of the county, is not an invasion of the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, as applied
to one who, as agent of a manufacturer in another state, in this
way sells and delivers sewing machines which he has with him
at the time of soliciting purchases: affirming State v. Emert,
103 Mo. 241 ; S. C., 15 S. W. Rep. 81.
This is a material qualification of the rule announced in
Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, that a state cannot
impose a license tax on agents soliciting orders for goods
manufactured out of the state; and shows an appreciation of
the difficulties which a strict adherence to that doctripe was
bound to cause. It is a promise of better things to come.
A judgment entered in pursuance of a warrant of attorney,
n a state in which such judgments are authorized, has the
same force, when sued on in another state, as a
Judgment,
Foreign,
judgment in adversary
; an action
Warrant of

proceedings

thereon can only be defeated by want of jurisdiction in the court, by fraud in procuring the judgment, or by
defences based on matters arising after the judgment was
rendered; such defences as payment before judgment, the bar
of the statute of limitations to the foreign judgment, or any
other defence which applies to the original cause of action, are
conclusively negatived by the judgment; but the sufficiency
of the warrant to authorize the judgment may be inquired
into, and is to be determined from the evidence of the laws of
the state of its entry : Snyder v. Critchfield,(Supreme Court
of Nebraska,) 62 N. W. Rep. 306.
Attorney

A defendant who joins with the jurors in drinking at th&
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plaintiff's expense, and who gives the court no notice of the
occurrence until after the verdict is rendered,
Jury,
Improper
cannot urge, on a motion to set aside the verdict,
that the jurors were influenced in plaintiff's favor
Influence
by the gift of the liquor: Bradshaw v. Degenlzart, (Supreme
Court of Montana,) 39 Pac. Rep. 9 o .
When the jury, during the progress of a trial for murder,
read newspaper accounts of the proceedings, which report
them correctly, and contain nothing of an unfair
Misconduct,
Reading
or prejudicial nature, they are not guilty of such
Newspapers
misconduct as to require the granting of a new
trial: Peo. v. Leai:', (Supreme Court of California,) 39 Pac..
Rep. 24.

The same court holds, in accord with the general rule,.
that affidavits of jurors that the, had read newspaper reports
of the cause they were trying, during its progress,.
Impeaching
Verdict
are not admissible to impeach their verdict : Peo.
v. A.off, 39 Pac. Rep. 59.

See i Am. L. REG. & REv.

(N. S.) 877.
As the affidavits of the jurors themselves are incompetent
to impeach their verdict, affidavits made by others, which
purport to contain statements made by jurors, during alleged
conversations with them after the trial of the case was closed,
and they had been discharged, in reference to matters which
occurred in the jury room during the deliberations of the
jurors, are also incompetent, as resting on the mere statements
of the jurors themselves: Peterson v. Skjelver, (SupremeCourt of Nebraska,) 62 N. W. Rep. 43.
To the same effect is State v. Schaefer, (Mo.,) 22 S. W. Rep.,
447:

It is no defence to an action for malicious prosecution, that
the complaint was sworn to by the chief of police,
Malicious
Prosecution,
Liability of
Instigator

when he was induced to do so by the defendant,
and acted, in doing so, on information furnished
by the defendant: ZTang ney v. Sullivan, (Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts,) 39 N. E. Rep. 799.
The mayor of a city is not liable to an action of malicious.
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prosecution, for causing the arrest of a person under a city
ordinance subsequently declared invalid, when he
Prosecution
acted in good faith, though at the time of the
by Mayor
arrest he had some doubts as to the validity of the
under void
Ordinance

ordinance, and its enforcement rested exclusively
with the board of public works, which had refused to enforce
it, because they believed it to be invalid: Goodwin v. Guild,
(Supreme Court of Tennessee,) 29 S. W. Rep. 721. See
i Am. L. REG. & RE.V. (N. S.) 591, 865; 2 Am. L. REG. &
REv. (N. S.) 23, 94.
A railroad company is not liable for the act- of a brakeman,
who pushes a trespasser from one of its trains, because the
Master and Servant, trespasser will not pay for the privilege of
riding, the money not being demanded as
Railroads,
Liability for Acts

of

fare, and the brakeman having no authority
to collect fares; such an act is not within the scope of his
duty: Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Latham, (Supreme Court of
Mississippi,) 16 So. Rep. 757.
Judge Dallas, of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, has recently rendered a decision on a novel
& Reading R. R.
TradesUnlons, point of law, in Platt v. Plzila.
Co., 65 Fed. Rep. 66o. The railroad company
Membership
Forbidden
had, in 1887, adopted a rule that no one would
Employes

be employed by it who was a member of a labor organization, unless he would agree to withdraw therefrom ; and from
that time required every applicant for employment to sign an
application, representing that he was not a member of any
such organization, or that, if he was, he would withdraw
therefrom. Some years after, receivers 1Were appointed for
the company, who continued the same rule and practice; and
issued a notice, stating that it was their intention to discharge
ny employes who were members of labor organizations,
unless they severed their connection with them before a certain date. Certain of the employes of the receivers thereupon
petitioned the court to restrain the receivers from acting upon
this notice. It. appeared that all the petitioners had either
obtained employment by cancelling their membership in labor
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organizations, or had had notice of the rule, and had been
employed, in violation of it, by subordinate agents, without
the knowledge or consent of the receivers; and no others,
differently situated, asked to be made parties. The court
accordingly hed that the petitioners, who had thus violated
a known rule, had no standing whatever to seek to restrain its
enforcement; and that, in any case, the court would not direct
the receivers to abrogate a rule, established by the owners of
the property, and believed by them, and also by the receivers,
to be advantageous in its management, inasmuch as it
-involved nothing unlawful.
This decision is so plainly correct that it needs no commendation; but one may be pardoned for commenting upon
the impudence of such a claim, made by.men whose avowed
purpose is to prevent their employers from employing any
one who does not belong to their organizations. They seem
to be wholly ignorant of the maxim that he who seeks equity
must do equity.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has rejected the indefensible
rule as to imputed negligence declared in Prideauxv. Mffineral
Negligenre,
Imputed

Point, 43 Wis. 513, and has decided, in Roach v.
Western & A. R. Co., 21 S. E. Rep. 67, that

the negligence of the driver and owner of a private vehicle,
who, by that negligence, contributes to a collision with a
locomotive, is not imputable to another person riding in the
vehicle by invitation, unless that person had some right or
was under some duty to control or influence the driver's conduct;

e. S., such a right as might arise from their being

engaged in a joint enterprise for their common benefit; or
such a duty as might arise from the known or obvious incompetency of the driver, resulting, for instance, from drunkenness,.
or other cause.
That court had already decided, in East Tenn., Va. & Ga
R. Co. v. Markens, 88 Ga. 6o; S. C., 13 S. E. Rep. 855, that
a passenger in a public hack is under no duty to supervise the
actions of the driver at a public crossing, nor to look for
approaching trains, unless she has some reason to distrust the
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driver's diligence in regard to such matters; and had prescribed the limits of the imputation of the custbdian of a
minor child to its parents, in Atlanta & Air-Line Ry. Co. v.
Granitt, 20 S. E. Rep. 550; 2 A i. L. REG. & REv.
(N. S.) 97.
An injunction will not lie to restrain a school board from
awarding a contract to one who is not the lowest bidder, when
Public
the board reserved the right to reject any and all
Contracts,
bids, where there is no evidence of fraud on the
Injunction
part of the bidder, and where there is no statute
requiring contracts to be awarded to the lowest bidder:
Cliandler v. Board of Education of Cit , of Detroit,(Supreme
Court of Michigan,) 62 N. W. Rep. 370.
A taxpayer max enjoin a void contract: Beebe v. Board of
Supervisors of Sullivan Co., 64 Hun. (N. Y.) 377; PVormington v. Pierce, 22 Oreg. 6o6. But one company cannot enjoin
another company and the board of commissioners appointed
to let public contracts for the state from proceeding under a
contract to bind state documents, awarded by the said board to
the latter company, though that company has failed to give
bond as required by law, and though its bid was not so low
as that of the complainant, if the suit is not brought on behalf
of the state or as a taxpayer; such contracts, and the provisions of the statute prescribing the manner of letting them,
being intended to protect the public interests, and not those
of individuals, as such: Arkansas Democrat Co. v. Press
Printing Co., (Ark.,) 21 S. W. Rep. 586.
A notary public is a public officer, within the meaning of
Public Officer, a constitutional provision that any public officer
Railroad Passes who shall travel on a free pass shall forfeit his
office: Peo. v. Rathbone, (Supreme Court of New York,)
32 N. Y. Suppl. io8.
When a public office is intruded into, without color of right,
the court, on quo warranto, will impose such a
Fine
fine upon the usurper, as appears, under the cir-

QuoWarranto,

cumstances of the case, to be proper: State v. Davis, (Supreme
Court of New Jersey,) 31 Atl. Rep. 218.
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The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Chicago, Burlington &
Quiny R?. R. Co. v. Bell, 62 N. W. Rep. 314, has given
a clear exposition of the legal status of a railroad
Release and
Discharge,
relief department, and the binding effect of the
Railroad
Relief
Association

contract by which an employe, receiving aid from
the department, agrees to release all claims against

the company for injuries. It holds: (i) That in the absence
of all evidence on the subject, it cannot be presumed that the
establishment and operation of such a department is an act
ultra vires; (2) That the contract aforesaid does not lack
consideration; (3) That the promise made by the employe to
the relief department for the benefit of the railroad company is
available to the latter, either as a cause of action, or as
a defence; (4) That such a contract is not against public
policy; (5) That the effect of the contract is not to enable the
railroad company to exonerate itself by contract from liability
for the negligence of itself or its servants; (6) That the
employe does not, by such a contract, waive his right of action
against the railroad company for injuries due to its negligence;
(7) That it is not the execution of the contract that estops the
employe from recovering for injuries due to the negligence of
the company, but his acceptance of moneys from the relief
department on account of such injuries, after his cause of
action against the company has accrued; and that therefore,
(8) When an employe of the railroad, who is also a member
of the relief department, has been injured through the negligence of the company, and has received money from the funds
of the relief department, on account of the injury, he cannot
recover from the company, in an action for damages for that
injury, in the absence of proof that he was induced to become
a member of the relief department, or to execute the contract
and release, or to accept the money paid him by the relief
department, through fraud or mistake.
This is in full accord with the almost unanimous current of
decision. In every reported case, except one, the courts have
held the agreement to release the company on receiving
benefits from the relief department good, because it does not
absolutely deprive the employe of his right of action against

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

the company, but merely puts him to an election between
a suit for damages and the acceptance of benefits : Owens v.
B. & 0. R. R., 35 Fed. Rep. 715 ; Johnson v. P. & R. R. R.,
(Pa.,) 29 Atl. Rep. 854, affirming 2 D. R. (Pa.) 229. This
distinguishes such a release from an absolute undertaking to
release the employer from all liability as a condition of being
The latter has always been held
received into service.
invalid: Roesner v. Hermann, 8 Fed. Rep. 782; Kans. Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Peavey, 29 Kans. 169; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co.
v. Spangler, 44 Ohio St. 471. Such a contract, also, is not
bad for want of mutuality, when the company is a member of
the association, and a party to the contract by which the
employe becomes a member: Leas v. Penna. Co., (Ind.,) 37
N. E. Rep. 423.

The question of consideration is a more serious one. It is
not so apparent at first sight that any consideration moves
from the company; but an investigation of the affairs of such
associations will almost always show that the company is
itself a contributor to the funds of the department, guarantees
any deficit that may happen, and pays the running expenses.
This is of course a valuable consideration; and can hardly be
said to be insufficient. For instance, the Reading Railroad
contributed sioo,ooo to its relief department at its formation; the Baltimore & Ohio contributed the same; and the
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy had, at the time of the Bell
seit, contributed over $i iO,OOO to its relief department. These

sums certainly bore a fair proportion to the contributions of
the members of the association.
There is one serious objection, however, to the validity of
such a release, in certain cases. Where membership is voluntary, as in the C., B. & Q. and Pennsylvania Company departments, there can be no question of the binding force of the
contract. The contract is mutual, and rests on a valuable consideration, as has been shown; and the 'employe contracts as
a free agent. But when membership is compulsory, as in the
Reading, B. & 0., and London & Northwestern relief departments, it can hardly be claimed that the employe is wholly
free to make his choice. It is true that he is not bound to
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release the company. He may sue it; but then he loses the
contributions which he has been forced to pay into the relief
department. It is not a sufficient answer to this that he is not
bound to accept employment on the railroad. The company
has no right to require such a contract of him.

It

is an

unconscionable one, and one that the courts ought not to
enforce. And still less is it an answer to say, without assigning
reasons for it, that the contract is for the advantage of the
employe, as has been said in Johnson v. P. & R. R. R., (Pa.,)
29 Atl. Rep. 854, and by the Court of Appeal of England,
of whom one would expect better things, in Clements v.
London & N. W. Ry. Co., [1894] 2 Q. B. 482. In such a
case, (though not in that,) the criticism of Hallett, J., in Miller
v. C., B. & Q. R. R., 65 Fed. Rep. 305, applies with full force:
- Having paid for benefits, on what principle can he be required
to renounce them?"
This distinction, however, has been
overlooked by the courts, and it has even been held that an
infant, entering the employ of a railroad which made membership in the relief association a condition of service, was bound
'by the contract of release: Clements v. London & N. W. Ry.
Co., [1894] 2 Q. B. 482.
One case is opposed to this consensus of opinion: Ailler v.
C., B. & Q. R. R., 65 Fed. Rep. 305. But this, though strongly
argued by the judge, was a case of voluntary membership, and
therefore the release would, in the absence of fraud or mistake, be unquestionably valid.
But while it seems to be settled, for the present at least, that
the employe himself will be bound by the release, in case he
elects to receive benefits from the relief association, it does not
bar the rights of others to recover for injuries to the employe;
and therefore the widow and children are not debarred from
action against the company, unless they have executed individual releases. Even if the widow has accepted benefits and
given a release, she will not be barred from bringing an action
as administratrix on behalf of her children: C., B. & Q. R. R.
v. Wymore, 4o Neb. 645; S.'C., 58 N. W. Rep. I12o. But if a
widow releases her right of action in order to enable the
:mother of the employe, who was designated as the beneficiary,

234

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

to recover benefits, she will be barred thereby: State v. B. &
0. R. R., 36 Fed. Rep. 655; and it has been held that if the
wife and child recover damages, the mother cannot recover
benefits: Fullerv. B. & 0. Employes' Relief Assn., 67 Md. 43 ;
S. C., io Atl. Rep. 237. This, however, is rank injustice. The
two claims rest on a different footing. Neither is bound by the
release in the contract of membership; and their rights are
entirely distinct, neither depending in the slightest degree on
the other. The ruling is indefensible.
Finally, there may be a distinction between cases where the
release is only found in the contract of membership in the
relief association, and those in which the prudence of the
company exacts a new release on the acceptance of benefits:
Martin v. B. & 0. R. R., 41 Fed. Rep. 125 ; Graft v. B. & 0.
R. R., (Pa.,) 8 AtI. Rep. 2o6; Spitze v. B. & 0. R. R., 75 Md.
162; S. C., 23 Atl. Rep. 307. This, however, is doubtful. If
the contract is good in the first instance, the second release
is superfluous; if it is bad, the requirement of a new release as
a condition of receiving benefits is but an act of coercion, and an
attempt to evade liability, which should not be countenanced.
Even if the release of the railroad is good, it is doubtful
whether the provision that no benefits shall be paid if the
company is sued, is valid. That contract seems to be wholly
without consideration. The employe, in case he sues the
company, forfeits all contributions, and the relief association
receives the benefit of them, without the slightest return.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has lately held, that the
judgment of the state superintendent of schools is as conclusive on the matters over which authority is given
Schools,
Decision of
him to decide, as the judgment of a legally created
State Supercourt of limited jurisdiction, acting within the
intendent,
Mandamus to bounds of its authorit.,, would be; and therefore
Enforce
a teacher, who has si-cessfully litigated before
the state superintendent the dispute' questions on which her
right to compensation depends, is. enatled to a writ of mandamus to enforce a decision in her favor; and in such a case
it is only necessary for the relator to show that the state
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superintendent had jurisdiction of the matter in dispute, and
over the parties to the controversy: Thompson v. Board of
Education of Borough of Ei;ner, 31 Atl. Rep. 168.
The Supreme Court of the United States, though technically
deciding it, has yet left the Income Tax question in a state of
uncertainty by a division of opinion, Justices
Taxation,
Income Tax
HARLAN, BROWN, SHIRAS and WHITE being in
favor of the constitutionality of the law, 'and Chlief Justice
FULLER and Justices FIELD, GRAY and BREWER holding it
unconstitutional. This, of course, means a reargument of the
points in dispute as soon as Mr. Justice JACKSON is able to sit.

The rulings, in brief, were these: The court decided, against
the dissent of Justices HARLAN and WHITE, (I) That so much
of the act as attempted to impose a tax upon the rental or
income of real estate, as such taxes are direct taxes, is unconstitutional; and (2) That so much of the act as attempted to
levy a tax on municipal lands is unconstitutional. But the
Justices were divided on the following questions: (I) Whether
the void provisions as to rents and income from real estate
invalidate the whole act; (2) Whether as to the income from
personal property as such, the act is unconstitutional as laying
direct taxes; (3) Whether any part of the tax, if not considered
as a dircct tax, is invalid for want of uniformity on either of
the grounds suggested. It is to be hoped that we may soon
have a final decision of these questions.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas. when a telegram is sent to an address
outside of the telegraph company's free-delivery
Delivery,

Delay

limits, but without notifying the sender that the
address is outside of those limits, and the agent

at the receiving office has been for years in the habit of
sending messages outside such limits by hackmen and others,
without extra charge, and undertakes to do the same with the
telegram in question, the company is liable for the delay of
the person who undertakes to deliver the telegram, though
the form in which it is sent exempts the company from
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liabi'ity for delay in delivering the message outside its freedelivery limits : Western Union Tel. Co. v. Womack, 29 S. W.
Rep. 932When, at the opening of a term of court, the judge has the
court-house clock set by true sun time, given by a sun-dial,
Time,
and the sessions of the court are held according to
Computation that clock, the hour at which the term expires will

be fixed by the true sun time, and not by what is known as
"standard" time: Parkerv. State, 29 S. W. Rep. 480.
The presumption always is that common time is meant. If
the return of a summons issued by a justice of the peace is to
be made according to standard time, the summons should so
state, or it will be presumed that it was to be returned according to common time: Searles v. Averhoff, 26 Neb. 668; S.C.,
44 N. W. Rep. 872. In Georgia, the only time recogniied by
law is common time, based on the meridian; and standard time
,cannot be substituted at will for that recognized by law:
Henderson v. Reynolds, 84 Ga. 159; S. C., io S. E. Rep. 734.
Trees growing in a city street are under the control of the
city, and it may have them cut down, to make
Trees,
Removal by room for a sidewalk, even though the fee of the
City
street does not belong to the city: City of Mt.
armnelv. Shaw, (Supreme Court of Illinois,)139 N. E. Rep. 584.
The House of Lords has recently decided, that the owner of
land overhung by trees growing on his neighbor's land is
Removal of entitled, without notice, to cut the branches so
-Overbanging far as they overhang, provided that he does not
Branches
trespass on his neighbor's land; even though
they have so overhung for more than twenty years: Lemmon
v. Webb, [1894] App. Cas. i; affirming [1894] 3 Ch. i. See
i Am. L. REG. & REv. (N. S.) 822.
When a witness to a will is unable to write, and his signa-wills,
Witness,

Signature

ture is written, at his . quest, by another person,
but the witness neither ouches the pen nor the
hand of the person wh

does the writing, the

subscription is invalid: McFarland v. Bush, (Supreme Court
of Tennessee,) 29 S. W. Rep. 899.
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The Supreme Court of Arkansas, following the weight of
authority, has recently held, that, in the absence of express
statutory authority, an expert who testifies for
Witness,
Fees,
the state in a criminal case cannot demand extra
Expert
compensation as an expert, in addition to the
usual witness fees, at least when he is not compelled to make
any preliminary examination or preparation, and is not compelled to attend and listen to the testimony: Flinnv. Praiie
Co.,,29 S. W. Rep. 459.

When no demand is made in advance for special compensation, an expert witness can recover only the statutory witness
fees : Board of Commissioners of Larimer Co. v. Lee, 3 Colo.
App. 177; S. C., 32 Pac. Rep. 841.

